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Abstract 
Lien Nguyen, Unto Häkkinen, Markku Pekurinen, Gunnar Rosenqvist, Hennamari Mikkola. 
Determinants of health care expenditure in a decentralized health care system. National Institute 
for Health and Welfare (THL), Discussion Papers 21/2009. Helsinki 2009.
This paper casts a different light on the relationship between income and the municipal tax 
rate, while investigating the determinants of per capita total health expenditure in Finland. Two 
2-way fixed-effects models are estimated applying a simple two-stage estimation procedure to 
municipality-level panel data (N = 415) for the period 1993–2004. 
Key determinants of per capita total health expenditure were the proportion of elderly, the 
rate of disability pensions, the employment-to-population ratio, the municipal tax rate, the state 
reimbursements of prescription medicines and private dental care, income, and population 
density. The hospital districts were statistically significantly associated with health expenditure. 
Both measures of income elasticity were small (0.045 and 0.020), implying that public health 
care is a major necessity good. The findings suggest that the high use of prescription medicines 
has resulted from increased population morbidity and that local tax rates have been used as a 
method of financing local services. 
Keywords: Municipal health expenditure, local government, panel data analysis, decentralization, 
federalism 
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Introduction 
A considerable number of empirical studies have tried to explain variations in health expenditure 
using different types of data, models and explanatory variables. Numerous macro-level studies 
have shown that income is the main non-demographic driver of health expenditure, as seen in 
the high and positive income elasticity of health expenditure (Getzen, 2000; Committee, 2006; 
OECD, 2006). Concerns have been expressed over this conclusion. First, the magnitude of income 
elasticity tends to increase with the level of aggregation, i.e. the higher the level of aggregation, the 
higher the elasticity (Getzen, 2000; Committee, 2006; OECD, 2006). Further, measured income 
elasticities are found to be typically small in those studies using regional-level data (Getzen, 2000; 
Committee, 2006; OECD, 2006). Moreover, they tend to be close to zero or even negative in those 
studies using individual-level data (Getzen, 2006). 
No consensus on the appropriate magnitude of income elasticity of health expenditure has 
been reached, suggesting that the estimated high measures of income elasticity (above unity) 
may result from aggregation problems and omitted variable bias and is thus a failure to control 
for many confounding factors, such as prices or costs, health status, and differences in health 
care utilization. In addition, one may argue that at the aggregate level, income is closely related 
to the use of new medical technology and products. For example, in many developed countries 
and also in Finland, expenditure on pharmaceuticals during the last decade has increased more 
rapidly than other types of health expenditure or GDP. The main driver for the increase in this 
expenditure type is thought to be the introduction of new and more expensive medicines. More to 
the point, it is currently well recognized that health expenditure is determined by a complex series 
of demand and supply side factors, like population health status, economic growth, new medical 
techniques and progress, methods of organizing and financing health care, as well as health care 
resources, in addition to aging or other demographic factors (Häkkinen and Luoma, 1995; Di 
Matteo and Di Matteo, 1998; Gianonni and Hittris, 2002; Cantarero, 2005; Crivelli et al., 2006). 
The Finnish health care system can be considered one of the most decentralized in the world 
(Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005) seen in the light of a fiscal federalism framework (Oates, 1999). In 
principle, public goods that are consumed locally should be produced locally. Decentralization 
is promoted because it is believed to lead to increased welfare as the local authorities are allowed 
or/and expected to act in accordance with local preferences, local cost structures, and local 
accountability to community priorities. In Finland, local preferences are assumed to be included 
in the provision of services through local elections. Moreover, the local authorities can decide 
levels of their own local tax rates and means to organize services as well as how much they invest 
in health care. Due to these financial incentives, they are expected to behave in an efficient way in 
order to contain the costs of services. Further, annually each municipality has to allocate resources 
not only to health care but also to the other local service sectors, such that all allocated resources 
must be balanced according to the municipality’s existing resources.
At the macro level, compared to many other countries, the Finnish health care system 
seems to curtail the costs of health care rather well. Per capita health expenditure and the share 
of GDP in Finland have been relatively lower than the equivalent figures in many developed 
and Nordic countries (Moilanen et al., 2008). This result is partly attributable to the relatively 
low wages of health care personnel and partly to the especially effective cost management of the 
municipalities (Häkkinen, 2009). However, to be able to make appropriate health policy, one 
needs to understand municipal economic behavior. This in turn calls for identifying the factors 
involved in municipal choices in dealing with health expenditure in addition to the factors 
determining health expenditure.
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In this paper, we apply a two-stage estimation procedure to municipality-level panel data 
for the period 1993–2004 to investigate the determinants of per capita total municipal health 
expenditure in Finland. Our analysis adds new aspects to the existing empirical research. First, 
it offers an opportunity to look closer at the complex relationship between income and health 
expenditure. Income is characterized as having not only a direct effect on health expenditure 
but also another effect via the local tax rate for financing local health care. One can assume 
that in a typically small and rather homogenous country, health technology has diffused quite 
simultaneously and equally in all parts of the country, owing to which the income effect can 
be measured more precisely. Second, as each local government authority annually decides 
simultaneously upon both the levels of all public expenditures and the level of the local tax rate, 
our analysis is partly based on behavioral modeling of local public expenditure determination. 
Third, there have been several local experiments in Finland in containing health expenditure 
over the last decade. Thus, this study also allows us to analyze their impact on the municipal 
total health expenditure. 
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The Finnish health care system 
In terms of institutional structure, financing and goals, the Finnish health care system resembles 
those of other Nordic countries and the UK. The system covers the whole population with services 
being mainly produced by the public (municipal) sector and financed through general taxation. 
Each municipality is, either alone or in federation with others, responsible for providing basic 
services, such as health and dental care, nursing homes and other social services for the elderly, 
child day care, social assistance, and basic education. Municipally provided health care covers 
primary care (mostly produced in health centers) and specialized hospital care, which are financed 
by municipal taxes, state grants, and user charges. The private health care sector complements 
the municipal sector, playing an essential role particularly in both dental and occupational health 
care. National Health Insurance (NHI) subsidizes the use of certain private health services, such 
as outpatient prescribed medicines, examinations and treatments performed by doctors, dental 
care, and transportation expenses (see Appendix A).
In terms of specialized care provision, twenty hospital districts that own the hospitals (i.e. 
university, central, and regional hospitals) produce most of the specialized outpatient and inpatient 
care services. Each municipality has to be affiliated to one of these hospital districts. The two 
parties mutually consent prospectively to a framework contract concerning prices and quantities 
of services needed in the coming year. The hospitals typically apply standard bed-day, case-based 
(e.g. DRG-based) and mixed pricing (combined fee-for-service and bed-day pricing). Some 
municipalities are also able to produce by themselves certain specialized care services and provide 
long-term care services in their own health centers. According to the current legislation, both the 
NHI and patients are financing outpatient and private health care prescription medicines, whereas 
the municipalities pay for other medicines (those used in the public hospitals and nursing homes). 
Municipalities vary greatly in the size of population for which they are responsible. The 
smallest town Velkua has a population of 233 inhabitants (as of 2004), whereas more than half 
a million people inhabit the capital Helsinki. Half of the 415 municipalities have a population 
not greater than 5000, with only 15 municipalities having more than 50  000 (as of 2004). 
Cost-sharing is generally higher for privately provided services than for the corresponding 
municipally provided services. For example, user charges account for roughly 35% of the total 
cost of medicines prescribed outside hospitals, whereas they only contribute 10% to the total 
cost of services provided by the health centers and 5% of the total cost of specialized hospital 
care services. However, when patients use long-term care in a health center ward or a municipal 
nursing home, the charge for lodgings will be up to 80% of the individual’s disposable income. 
In 2006, the state, municipalities, NHI, and households respectively contributed 21%, 39%, 17%, 
and 20% to the financing of the total health care expenditure. Private health insurance roughly 
accounted for 2% of that overall financing. Privately produced health care represented 20% of 
the total value of health care production. Occupational health care was offered to about 84% of 
all the employees in Finland in 2004 (Vuorenkoski, 2008).
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Theoretical and practical background 
One special case of the broader question of modeling how lower levels of government decide a 
whole variety of policies is the behavioral modeling of local public expenditure determination 
(Wildasin, 1986). Using the preferences and budget constraints of a single agent, the median 
voter model has often been applied to local public expenditure on public services (Wildasin, 
1986; Rubinfeld, 1987) and more recently to the effects of intergenerational social benefits and 
municipality sizes on public spending (Strömberg, 2006; Breunig and Rocaboy, 2008). 
Previous empirical models of health expenditure determinants at the macro level fall into two 
broad approaches. In the context of a demand model framework, the major driving forces behind 
the growth in health expenditures are found to be per capita income, aging of the population, 
population’s size and age- or/and gender-specific utilization of health care (see e.g. Gerdtham and 
Jönsson, 2000; Getzen, 2000). Alternatively, emphasizing the supply side of health expenditures and 
the institutional factors of health systems, other studies have shown that the main determinants 
of health spending are the relative price of health care, public provision and financing, supply 
of health care personnel and resources, as well as national income and age structure. A mixed 
approach focuses on local health expenditures in the long-term in a characteristically decentralized 
health system. Local health expenditure is first considered as an outcome resulting from both 
supply- and demand-side factors and their interactions, but is also considerably influenced by 
new technologies and medical progress as well as by structural or/and organizational factors, 
including some features of public choice (democracy) (Di Matteo and Di Matteo, 1998; Gianonni 
and Hittris, 2002; Cantarero, 2005; Crivelli et al., 2006; Cantarero and Lago-Peñas, 2009). 
Irrespective of the approach or data used, the main constraint on health expenditure is 
thought to be determined by income, while health expenditure levels are determined by the relative 
price or price proxy of health care. However, no consensus has been reached on whether health 
care is a normal or luxury good; this is in no small part due to the numerous statistical methods 
applied and the various types of data used, as well as the absence of a reasonably convincing 
theoretical model (Gerdtham and Jönsson, 2000; Di Matteo and Di Matteo, 1998; Getzen, 2006; 
Cantarero and Lago-Peñas, 2009). As discussed, the impacts of income and price of health care 
on health expenditures at the macro level are complicated by many confounding factors, from 
which an aggregation fallacy in the estimation of the income elasticity of health expenditure 
arises. Nevertheless, efforts to examine the determinants of local health expenditure using a 
panel data model approach have identified several central factors, such as per capita income, the 
proportion of population aged 65 or over, urbanization, unemployment, mortality, population 
density, and physician density (Cantarero, 2005; Cantarero and Lago-Peñas, 2009; Crivelli et al., 
2006; Järviö and Luoma, 1999). 
The key assumptions of the median voter model (single-peaked preferences, true preference-
based voting, and a one-dimensional public good) are seen to be quite restrictive. As such, the 
model cannot be used to explain municipal health expenditures in Finland (Häkkinen and Luoma, 
1995; Moisio, 2002; Häkkinen, 2009). Indeed, local politics in Finland is built on a multi-party 
system, while the budget decisions made by the municipal councils are typically multi-dimensional. 
In addition, many health centers are run by federations of municipalities, where the decision-
making of a single municipality can be diminished. Furthermore, the hospital districts make use 
of their own definitions and methods for calculating service prices in their operational activities, 
which the affiliated municipalities generally have to accept (Mikkola, 2002). 
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The present study is based on a slight variation of behavioral modeling of local public 
expenditure determination (Wildasin, 1986), focusing on the demand side factors of health care 
and expenditure and the health system-related characteristics as a way of explaining variation 
in municipal total health spending. As a result of the decentralization, the organization and 
production of municipal health care can be seen as an efficient process where local authorities 
are able to take into account municipality-specific preferences and needs while containing service 
costs and balancing resource allocation across local service sectors (Oates, 1999). If health care is a 
policy priority of local government, then the delegation of fiscal responsibility to local authorities 
is expected to increase local health expenditure and thus total local expenditure. 
Studying the impact of income on total municipal health expenditure involves the inspection 
of income disparities at the municipality level. Since income is thought to determine the optimal 
amount of health spending for a society or jurisdiction, it has a direct effect on the financing of 
health services and thus on health spending. There are no restrictions upon the local tax instrument 
for the municipalities. If the local authorities do not want to overspend and rely on debt, they can 
impose higher levels of their proportional local tax rates. A higher local tax rate results naturally 
in higher local income tax revenues. This suggests that another effect on local health expenditure 
of income is transferred via the interaction between income and the local tax rate. Hence, an 
increase in health expenditure related to the provision of public health care has to be offset against 
the amount of income tax revenue raised by the method of financing. Theoretically, a lump-sum 
grant shifts the local budget to the right, generating an income effect on the consumption of local 
health care and thus on local health expenditure (Wildasin, 1986). However, in practice when 
the local authorities attempt to contain public expenditures and enhance competition as well, no 
assurance can be given that they spend the allocated grant, non-earmarked as well as earmarked, 
on the provision of a certain public good (Tuomala, 1997; Häkkinen, 2009).
Education has been found to have a large and considerable impact on health and consumption 
of health care at the individual and national level (Grossman, 1972, 2000) and is expected to 
affect and change health expenditure via the relationship between health status and health care 
consumed. It has been argued that after the 1990s, the main driver of health spending is not 
price but volume of health care (Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 2005). In addition, the graying and 
aging process has brought about a relatively higher number of certain treatments or increased 
intensity of services and treatment episodes, which may play an important role in explaining 
variation in health spending (Getzen, 2006; Häkkinen and Lehto, 2005). Moreover, it has been 
argued that increased expenditure on prescription medicines in Finland arises from technological 
developments and the applicability of new pharmaceuticals, as well as from larger patient groups 
and the aging of population (Vuorenkoski, 2008). 
Local governments seem to have experienced large variations in health needs and revenues. 
Decentralization of expenditure responsibility and competences has led to wide differences 
between the municipalities in terms of per capita health care expenditures (Hujanen et al., 
2006). This is likely attributed to variations in health needs, clinical practice, and the delivery of 
health care between both the municipalities and the hospital districts. In addition, the very small 
municipalities have experienced increasing difficulties with securing enough skilled health care 
professionals to provide services. Furthermore, they have also faced growing financial difficulties 
as the economic risks of hospital care expenditures are relatively higher for them than for the 
bigger municipalities (Vuorenkoski, 2008). 
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Data and variable specifications
We make use of previously gathered municipality-level panel data (N = 415) for the period 
1993–2004 (T = 12) (Hujanen et al., 2006). Additional municipal information was collected 
from the registers of Statistics Finland and the Social Insurance Institution. To take into account 
differences in costs and wages, we deflated the NHI reimbursement of prescribed medicines 
using cost indices of medicines (2004 = 100), disposable income using employees’ wage-level 
indices (2004 = 100), while all other monetary variables were deflated to 2004 prices using the 
municipal health care price indices.
The dependent variable is the per capita total municipal expenditure on health care services 
including primary, specialized and elderly care (hereafter THCE). This expenditure measure is 
defined explicitly in Appendix A. THCE is postulated to be dependent upon municipality-specific 
demographic, socioeconomic and organizational or/and structural factors describing the Finnish 
health care system. Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics of the selected variables and 
theoretical directions of the effects that the explanatory variables have on the dependent variable. 
The demographic factors are considered to be associated with the need and demand for 
health care. It is observed that treatment costs are high for children under school age, and 
health care costs increase rapidly for those older than 65. However, we include the shares of 
age- and gender-specific populations in the model as regressors so as to standardize the effects 
of age and gender on THCE and thus we do not specify their a priori expectations on THCE. 
Municipalities that differ by population size and level of urbanization are assumed to exhibit 
differences in the costs of producing services. Larger population is assumed to lower the cost of 
producing public services as a result of economic scales, an expectation also found in club theory 
(Rubinfeld, 1987). Municipalities’ acreages supposedly take into account the impact of distance 
and remote municipalities on the use of health care, but they are constant over time by nature. 
Hence, population density (a proxy for the urbanization level of each municipality, popden) can 
be assumed to display the effect of the size of population on THCE. 
Our income variable (inc) is constructed as the average after-tax income per household 
member (a weight of 1 for adults and ½ for children). Privately produced health services 
account for about 2.9% of the total annual national health expenditure (Moilanen et al., 2008). 
Unfortunately, we have no municipality-level cost information on occupational health services 
used in the private sector. Therefore, to control for the use of private health services on the part 
of those who are employed, we include the employment-to-population ratio (employ) in the 
model. As the use of private health care hypothetically reduces the need and demand for public 
health care, the direction of the effect of ‘employ’ on THCE is thought to be negative. Because 
higher educated people supposedly have good health status and thus need less health care than 
lower educated people, a greater ratio of higher educated inhabitants to the municipal population 
(eduhigh) is expected to reduce THCE. However, since education is normally highly correlated 
with income and health knowledge, a higher municipal education rate hypothetically augments 
THCE. Health status and morbidity variables appear to be the most important predictors of 
individual health care utilization (Hulka and Wheat, 1985). The age and gender standardized 
rate of disability pensions (disabi), which assesses the overall state of health and need for health 
care, is expected to be positively related to THCE. We do not include the mortality variable in 
the model because mortality is closely connected to the elderly populations, which the shares of 
population older than 64 already capture.
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TABLE 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics of the municipality-specific variables
Variable Definition
A priori
expec-
tation
Mean
(Overall) 
Standard deviation
Overall
 
Between 
groups
Within 
groups
Dependent variable
Total municipal health care expenditure per capita (€1000) 
(including primary, elderly and specialized care)
1.317 0.235 0.192 0.137
Independent variables
Demographic variables
a06pm Share of males aged 0–6 of population 0.041 0.009 0.008 0.004
a717pm Share of males aged 7–17 of population 0.076 0.011 0.011 0.004
a1840pm Share of males aged 18–40 of population 0.139 0.017 0.013 0.011
a4164pm Share of males aged 41–64 of population 0.172 0.018 0.014 0.010
a6574pm Share of males aged 65–74 of population 0.046 0.012 0.011 0.004
a7584pm Share of males aged 75–84 of population 0.022 0.008 0.007 0.004
a85pm Share of males aged 85 or over of population 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001
a06pf Share of females aged 0–6 of population 0.039 0.009 0.008 0.004
a717pf Share of females aged 7–17 of population 0.072 0.011 0.010 0.004
a1840pf Share of females aged 18–40 of population 0.124 0.021 0.018 0.010
a4164pf Share of females aged 41–64 of population 0.157 0.015 0.012 0.009
a6574pf Share of females aged 65–74 of population 0.054 0.012 0.012 0.004
a7584pf Share of females aged 75–84 of population 0.039 0.012 0.011 0.004
a85pf Share of females aged 85 or over of population 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.002
popden Population density (/104) − 0.005 0.020 0.020 0.001
Socioeconomic variables
inc Disposable income per capita (€1000) + 9.716 2.058 1.280 1.612
employ Ratio of the employed to population aged ≥ 18 − 0.488 0.070 0.063 0.029
eduhigh Share of high educated people of population aged ≥ 18 −/+ 0.139 0.068 0.048 0.049
disabi#
Age and gender standardized index of disability pensions of 
population aged 16–54
+ 1.166 0.354 0.346 0.074
tax Municipal tax unit rate −/+ 0.181 0.007 0.006 0.004
Structural and organizational variables
rexado
NHI reimbursement for private physician services and 
examinations per capita (€1000)
− 0.020 0.007 0.006 0.002
reden NHI reimbursement for private dental care per capita (€1000) − 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
remedi NHI reimbursement for prescribed medicines per capita (€1000) −/+ 0.192 0.039 0.031 0.024
subsidy
Total state grants allocated to the munucipality per capita 
(€1000)
+ 1.427 0.599 0.484 0.353
hoscom
= 1 if a health center hospital was merged with a hospital 
owned by some hospital district during the year when merging 
occurred or later
− 0.013 0.113 0.092 0.065
specare Share of specialized (inpatient) care of total health expenditure + 0.472 0.069 0.060 0.034
Cumulative year dummy variables
y9394 = 1 if 1994 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y9495 = 1 if 1995 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y9596 = 1 if 1996 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y9697 = 1 if 1997 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y9798 = 1 if 1998 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y9899 = 1 if 1999 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y9900 = 1 if 2000 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y0001 = 1 if 2001 ≤ year ≤ 2004
y0102 = 1 if year 2002 or 2003 or 2004
y0203 = 1 if year 2003 or 2004
y0304 = 1 if year 2004
Hospital districts as effects coding variables
Hd20 = −1 if the hospital district of Helsinki and Uusimaa
Hdj = 1 if the hospital district j (j = 1, 2, …, 19), 0 for the hospital district s ≠ j
NHI = National Health Insurance. # Whole country = 1.000.
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The municipality’s financial capacity is gauged by the municipal tax rate (tax). As argued, 
to meet all local demand for services and to cope with increased expenditure (and thus budget 
deficit), the municipalities can only impose a higher level of their proportional tax rates. This 
implies a positive association between the local tax rate and THCE. On the other hand, as publicly 
provided services often do not have market prices, we could consider the municipal tax rate as 
one kind of price variable for municipally provided health care: the higher the price, the lower 
the demand for health services and thus the level of health expenditure, other things being the 
same. Hence, the a priori direction of the effect on THCE of ‘tax’ is undecided. 
Because the use of private care presumably reduces the need and use of public care 
(substitution effects) and as NHI reimbursements are paid to patients, we expect all the NHI 
reimbursements (‘remedi’ for prescribed medicines, ‘reden’ for private dental care, and ‘rexado’ for 
both private physician services and examinations) to be negatively related to THCE. However, there 
exists a cost-shifting problem among the parties due to ambiguities at the interface of institutional 
and outpatient care entailed by the dual-channel financed health care system (Huttunen, 2008). 
Further, evidence from many previous international studies shows a positive relationship between 
health expenditure and prescription drugs. Hence, our expectation of the direction of the effect of 
‘remedi’ on THCE is not a priori clear. Mergers between hospitals and health centers with hospital 
wards from the same hospital districts are expected to increase hospitals’ operational scale and 
thus lessen THCE, owing to the exhibition of economics of scale in the provision of health care. 
During 1993–2004, this kind of hospital merger occurred in 12 municipalities. This activity is one 
of several local reforms carried out to improve the collaboration between primary and secondary 
health care and to improve efficiency and contain health care expenditure (Vuorenkoski, 2008). 
Since the Finnish health care system has relied heavily on inpatient care practices, we attempted 
to use the share of inpatient care of THCE as an indicator of allocative inefficiency. If THCE 
significantly increases with a higher share of inpatient care, health resources are considered to be 
inefficiently allocated, as an outpatient-oriented service mix would be relatively cheaper. However, 
we dropped the variable from the final estimated model. 
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Statistical methods 
The econometric model 
Panel data allows us to control and test for municipality and time-invariant effects and to conduct 
appropriate estimations in the presence of those invariant effects (Baltagi, 1995; Greene, 2000). 
A general model specified to yit, the THCE of an inhabitant living in municipality i = 1, 2, …, N 
measured in year t = 1, 2, …, T, is of the form 
(1)  yit = α + xit β + εit + μi + νt 
where α is a common intercept and βs are the regression coefficients (for all the municipalities). 
Vector xit denotes the time-varying explanatory variables, εit is the error term, and μi and νt are 
the municipality-specific term and the time-specific term respectively. The two-way fixed effects 
(FE) model (1) assumes that μi and νt are fixed constants for each municipality and each time 
period respectively. In this panel data estimation, the appropriate model appears to be an OLS 
model including both the municipality-specific and time-specific dummy variables. As such, the 
unknown time and municipality effects on the dependent variable can be displayed as changes 
in the intercept. The error term εit ~ iid (0, σ2) represents a time-varying idiosyncratic random 
error term, accounting for unknown time and municipality effects not included in the regression. 
Alternatively, a two-way random effects (RE) model can be specified as 
(2)  yit = α + xit β + μi + νt + ηit 
where εit = μi + νt + ηit  is now the stochastic part of the model, μi ~ iid (0, σ2), νt ~ iid (0, σ2), and 
ηit ~ iid (0, σ2). This is also called an error components model, which can be estimated using 
generalized least squares (GLS). 
Estimation strategy 
We used F- and t-tests to check the statistical significance of the independent variables in a 
preliminary analysis and the F-tests to find out time and municipality effects on the dependent 
variable (Table 2). To choose between FE and RE models, we used Hausman tests (Hausman, 
1978). The Hausman test results showed that there were differences in the coefficients estimated 
by the efficient RE estimator and the consistent FE estimator (Table 2). Therefore, the exogeneity 
of the regressors with respect to the time-invariant error term was rejected, leading us to consider 
the two-way FE model. The FE model is viewed as a reasonable approach since the full set of 
municipalities is included in the model and differences in THCE between the municipalities can 
be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression function (Greene, 2000). The application of the 
FE model is also supported because the within-variation of many of the explanatory variables is 
relatively high, suggesting a low statistical efficiency of the RE model (see Table 1). 
Many empirical studies on the determinants of local government expenditure and health 
care expenditure have specified a double logarithmic function (e.g. Gerdtham and Jönsson, 
2000). Nevertheless, with the attempt to further explore the role of income and local tax rate 
μ
η
ν
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on THCE and so as to more easily interpret the estimated results,1 we decided to apply a linear 
model in the primary analyses.2 As discussed, income is characterized as having two kinds of 
effect on THCE: a direct (income) effect and another effect via the local proportional tax rate. 
This connection between the local tax rate and income is specified as an interaction between ‘tax’ 
and ‘inc’, considered as a proxy for local income tax revenues, which appears as a regressor in our 
second two-way FE model. In the final models, we obtained robust (heteroschedasticity-adjusted) 
standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
Since considerable variations in clinical practice and the delivery of health care between the 
hospital districts can influence THCE, time-invariant regressors, such as the hospital districts, 
are also of interest in the modeling. When the covariates are time-invariant or rarely change 
over time, they are highly or perfectly correlated with the unit-level effect and thus they are not 
precisely estimated by the traditional FE model (Wooldridge, 2005). To obtain estimates from 
each of our two-way FE panel data models, we carry out a simple two-stage estimation that is 
adapted from the panel data study of Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997). In the first stage, the 
least squares estimation method drops all the hospital districts as they are constant over time. 
Hence, the individual (municipality) effect estimates also contain the effects of the time-invariant 
hospital districts. Therefore, in the second stage, we compute the individual fixed effects, which 
are actually the residuals from the first stage estimation. Then, these computed individual fixed 
effects are regressed on the constant exogenous hospital districts. This gives the coefficients of 
the hospital districts that were excluded in the first stage. Moreover, the residuals obtained from 
the second stage estimations are the estimates of individual fixed effects. 
1 According to the data, some municipalities had ‘negative’ grants and no population aged 85 or over in some years. The 
negative grants originated from the revenue sharing system, and those municipalities that experienced the negative grants were 
generally the wealthiest and biggest ones.
2 By using the Box-Cox method, a natural logarithmic functional form for the dependent variable was supported. In addition, 
Davidson and Mackinnon’s PE-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) provided support to a log-linear two-way FE model where 
positive continuous independent variables were log-transformed and the rest were untransformed. The coefficient of the share 
of inpatient care (specare) obtained from this estimated model was negative but statistically insignificant (heteroskedasticity-
adjusted t = –0.20) and thus ‘specare’ was dropped. For this model, the Breush-Pagan test carried out suggested the presence 
of heteroschedasticity (χ2(1) = 34.61, p = 0.000).  
TABLE 2. Tests of municipality and time effects of the linear model
Model
 
R2 total
 
Root
 MSE
Test statistic
 
p-value
 
Decision
 
Pooled OLS 0.6989 0.1295
Pooled OLS and 
municipality dummies
0.8841 0.0840 F(414, 4540) = 17.53 0.000
Municipality dummies 
jointly significant
Pooled OLS and time 
dummies
0.7212 0.1248 F(11, 4943) = 36.00 0.000
Time dummies jointly 
significant
Pooled OLS and both 
munipality and time 
dummies
0.8976 0.0790 F(426, 4529) = 20.62 0.000
Both municipality and 
time dummies jointly 
significant
Fixed effects vs. random 
effects
Hausman χ2(25) = 
244.89
0.000 1-way fixed effects model
Fixed effects including 
time effects
 
  F(11, 4529) = 54.07 0.000
2-way fixed effects model 
(since time dummies 
jointly significant)
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Results
Both the two-way FE models roughly explained 90% of the variation in the THCE with 70% of 
the within-variation in the outcome explained by changes in the explanatory variables exclusive 
to the municipality-specific effects (Table 3). Both the within R2 and total R2 values were slightly 
higher for Model 2, which took into consideration the local income tax revenue (taxinc). With 
the exception of the three regressors ‘inc’, ‘tax’ and ‘taxinc’, all the estimation results from both 
models that were statistically significant in the Model 1 remained so. 
For both genders, the proportions of populations aged 85 or over were positively related to 
THCE. This positive relationship has been found in many earlier empirical studies. As compared 
to the category of the proportion of boys under seven, the proportion of females aged 65–74 
(a6574pf) and that of girls under seven (a06pf) were negatively associated with THCE. In addition, 
some age and gender groups younger than 65 years (a717pm, a1840pf) and the population density 
(popden) were negatively related to THCE. 
The rate of disability pensions (disabi) and the employment-to-population ratio (employ) 
were positively associated with THCE. A lower reimbursement of private dental care (reden) and 
a higher reimbursement of prescribed medicines (remedi) were related to a higher THCE. The 
total state grants (subsidy) were insignificantly positively related to THCE. The coefficients of the 
variables ‘rexado’ (reimbursement of private physician services and examinations) and ‘hoscom’ 
(combination of hospitals) carried the expected negative signs, but they were not statistically 
significant. 
The positive coefficient of ‘inc’ was insignificant in Model 1, while it was highly statistically 
significant in Model 2. Moreover, the direction of the statistically significant effect of ‘tax’ altered 
from negative (Model 1) to positive (Model 2). Further, the local income tax revenue (taxinc) 
was negatively related to THCE (Model 2). Having used the estimation results from Model 2 to 
compute the total effect of ‘inc’ and the total effect of ‘tax’,3 the former was 0.0027 (std. err. = 
3.453/103) and the latter was –1.4651 (std. err. = 0.4553).4 As such, the magnitude of the total effect 
of ‘inc’ was smaller and the magnitude of the total effect of ‘tax’ was, in absolute values, higher 
than the magnitudes of the corresponding coefficients obtained from Model 1. Computed at the 
overall means, the income elasticity for Model 1 was 0.0449, whereas the income elasticity for 
Model 2 was 0.0200. Thus, both measured income elasticities were not only less than unity but 
were also very modest (vrt. Häkkinen and Luoma, 1995; Järviö and Luoma, 1999; Gerdtham and 
Jönsson, 2000), suggesting that THCE is indeed more of a major necessity than a luxury good. 
In both models, the coefficients of the total state grants (subsidy)—positive though statistically 
insignificant—were larger than the coefficients of income. Hence, the hypothesis of the ‘flypaper 
effect’ often tested in many empirical studies on regional expenditure (Wildasin, 1986) was 
supported in this study.5 
3 The predicted outcome from Model 2 can be simply written as othersxxbxbxby +++= 2132211 ˆˆˆˆ  where 
x1 = ‘tax’, x2 = ‘inc’, and x1x2 = ‘taxinc’. The total effect of ‘tax’ is 2311 ˆˆ)/ˆ( xbbxy +=∂∂ , of which the variance is 
)ˆ,ˆcov(2)ˆvar()ˆvar()ˆˆvar( 3123
2
21231 bbxbxbxbb ++=+ . The total effect of ‘inc’ is 1322 ˆˆ)/ˆ( xbbxy +=∂∂ , of which 
the variance is )ˆ,ˆcov(2)ˆvar()ˆvar()ˆˆvar( 3213
2
12132 bbxbxbxbb ++=+ .
4 Since the model is linear, those total effects can be computed using either the overall means of the variables or by computing 
them to each observation and then taking the averages of the individual total effects. Both computations give the same figures. 
The variances of both the total effects were computed at the overall means of the three independent variables.
5 However, in this study, ‘subsidy’ is not the state grant allocated for providing health services but the sum of all the state 
grants allocated for providing all local sector services.
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TABLE 3. First stage estimates from the two-way fixed effects models: factors associated with the per capita 
total municipal health care expenditure in 1993–2004
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value  
Constant 1.9836 3.55 *** 1.1101 1.83
y9394 -0.0523 -8.00 *** -0.0533 -8.19 ***
y9495 0.0162 2.62 ** 0.0179 2.92 **
y9596 0.0370 5.16 *** 0.0382 5.33 ***
y9697 0.0352 5.21 *** 0.0363 5.42 ***
y9798 0.0008 0.07 0.0051 0.45
y9899 -0.0125 -2.32 * -0.0109 -2.07 *
y9900 -0.0096 -1.80 -0.0078 -1.49
y0001 0.0404 6.58 *** 0.0431 7.21 ***
y0102 0.0159 2.61 ** 0.0197 3.24 ***
y0203 0.0731 10.44 *** 0.0769 11.23 ***
y0304 0.0407 5.82 *** 0.0448 6.56 ***
a717pm -2.0254 -3.22 *** -2.0553 -3.26 ***
a1840pm -0.2720 -0.40 -0.1033 -0.15
a4164pm -0.7125 -0.96 -0.7106 -0.96
a6574pm 0.9111 0.97 0.8987 0.96
a7584pm 2.5111 2.14 * 2.4962 2.12 *
a85pm 5.3977 3.12 ** 5.3172 3.10 **
a06pf -2.6716 -2.99 ** -2.7174 -3.04 **
a717pf -0.1935 -0.26 -0.1607 -0.22
a1840pf -1.8089 -2.17 * -1.7051 -2.04 *
a4164pf -1.0218 -1.42 -0.8169 -1.13
a6574pf -2.9740 -3.69 *** -2.8982 -3.57 ***
a7584pf 0.1697 0.21 0.2575 0.32
a85pf 7.2094 6.00 *** 7.2891 6.07 ***
popden -2.4033 -1.97 * -3.8443 -3.31 ***
disabi 0.0708 3.46 *** 0.0716 3.53 ***
employ 0.1385 1.96 * 0.1697 2.40 *
eduhigh 0.0329 0.27 -0.0195 -0.16
inc 0.0061 1.42 0.0891 4.97 ***
tax -1.3846 -3.02 ** 3.1700 2.73 **
rexadoc -0.0927 -0.13 -0.1034 -0.15
reden -2.6668 -3.58 *** -2.7272 -3.68 ***
remedi 0.5555 4.75 *** 0.5407 4.65 ***
subsidy 0.0105 1.04 0.0103 1.03
hoscom -0.0072 -0.63 -0.0077 -0.66
taxinc -0.4771 -4.53 ***
Model F(35, 4530) = 288.24 F(36, 4529) = 285.09
σu 0.1363 0.1451
σe 0.0790 0.0788
Rho 0.7483 0.7720
Corr(ui, Xb) 0.0698 -0.0736
Within R2 0.6974 0.6988
Between R2 0.4996 0.4325
Overall R2 0.5651 0.5213
Root MSE 0.0756 0.0755
Total R2 # 0.8975 0.8980
Root MSE # 0.0790 0.0789
Number of observations 415 415
Number of periods  12   12  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
# When the effects of the municipality dummies were present.
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TABLE 4. Second stage estimates: regression of the time-invariant hospital districts for the per capita total 
municipal health care expenditure in 1993–2004
Code
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Hospital disctrict Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value  
Constant 0.0060 3.38 *** 0.0051 2.74 **
Hd1 Varsinais-Suomi -0.0685 -12.54 *** -0.0685 -12.27 ***
Hd2 Satakunta -0.0329 -8.01 *** -0.0368 -8.76 ***
Hd3 Kanta-Häme -0.0339 -6.24 *** -0.0315 -5.53 ***
Hd4 Pirkanmaa -0.0302 -4.97 *** -0.0291 -4.77 ***
Hd5 Päijät-Häme -0.1498 -21.45 *** -0.1463 -17.85 ***
Hd6 Kymenlaakso -0.0845 -12.08 *** -0.0747 -8.81 ***
Hd7 Etelä-Karjala -0.1190 -18.92 *** -0.1191 -18.03 ***
Hd8 Etelä-Savo 0.0666 8.04 *** 0.0664 7.39 ***
Hd9 Itä-Savo 0.0525 8.51 *** 0.0481 7.88 ***
Hd10 Pohjois-Karjala -0.0110 -2.11 * -0.0158 -3.11 **
Hd11 Pohjois-Savo 0.0430 11.18 *** 0.0376 9.99 ***
Hd12 Keski-Suomi 0.0231 4.49 *** 0.0217 4.02 ***
Hd13 Etelä-Pohjanmaa -0.0249 -4.17 *** -0.0300 -5.09 ***
Hd14 Vaasa 0.0788 11.29 *** 0.0799 10.85 ***
Hd15 Keski-Pohjanmaa -0.0939 -11.30 *** -0.1010 -12.16 ***
Hd16 Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 0.0122 2.34 * 0.0092 1.78
Hd17 Kainuu 0.0475 3.33 *** 0.0389 2.72 **
Hd18 Länsi-Pohja 0.0568 3.98 *** 0.0608 4.24 ***
Hd19 Lappi 0.2458 23.51 *** 0.2351 22.93 ***
Hd20 Helsinki and Uusimaa 0.0224 2.52 * 0.0552 4.59 ***
Model F(19, 4960) = 120.47 F(19, 4960) = 106.59
R2 0.2875 0.2517
Root MSE 0.1151 0.1256
Number of observations  4980   4980  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Since the year dummy variables were defined cumulatively, each year variable displayed 
a change in the THCE as compared to the previous year’s outcome (Table 3). For example, the 
expected THCE for the year 1994 decreased approximately €52 (Model 1). During the 2000s, 
general technological developments and the growth of the economy have likely contributed to the 
increase in THCE. With the hospital districts constructed as effects coding variables and given 
THCE measured in €1000, a coefficient of 0.2458 for the hospital district of Lappi (Hd19) meant 
that the expected expenditure for that hospital district was about €246 higher than the grand 
mean of the expected expenditures for all the hospital districts (Table 4, Model 1). The individual 
effects of the municipality-specific dummies are presented in Figures B1−B2 in Appendix B. 
Both estimated models provided almost the same individual effects (correlation of 0.984). The 
individual effect of the capital Helsinki was found to be highest. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
Both measures of the income elasticity of THCE in this study were rather small. This result supports 
the view that the measured income elasticity of health expenditure above unity found in many 
earlier international macro-level studies may be overestimated due to omitted variable bias and/
or aggregation-related problems. Our estimated income elasticities probably reflected differences 
in the need-based use of health services rather than the ability to pay being a determinant of 
THCE. The finding is quite similar to and going in the same direction as that found in many other 
studies (e.g. Häkkinen et al., 2008). Setting the public sector on its own, the use of public health 
care is equally distributed. Income-related inequality in the total use of health care in a mixed 
health care system is generally generated by the use of private health care. On the other hand, 
the resulting significant positive coefficient of the employment-to-population ratio went against 
our expectation. Nevertheless, this positive association could be explained by the fact that the 
employed population’s earned incomes have boosted the municipalities’ financial condition and 
opportunities to invest in health care, which in turn leads to higher THCE. 
Although the use of age- and gender-specific populations was meant to standardize their 
effects on THCE, it is also of interest to note that the t-value and magnitude of the positive 
coefficient of ‘a85pf ’ are higher than the equivalent figures of the coefficient of ‘a85pm’ (Table 3). 
This result may indicate that the aging effect on THCE of the oldest female population is more 
concentrated than the corresponding effect of the male counterparts. For the males, the aging 
effect seems to have commenced a little earlier but intensified more slowly. The former impact 
is expressed by the statistically significant coefficient of ‘a7584pm’, while the latter impact by the 
sum of the coefficients of ‘a7584pm’ and ‘a85pm’ being almost equal to the coefficient of ‘a85pf ’. 
Among the explanatory financial factors affecting THCE, the highest negative coefficient 
found is that of private dental care. This bears out the fact that private dental care has been used 
substantially due to insufficient availability of public dental care, and in particular to the age-
based restrictions on public care before the dental care reform of 2002 (Vuorenkoski, 2008). 
On the other hand, the highest positive coefficient found is that of the NHI reimbursement of 
prescribed medicines, suggesting that the use of prescribed medicines has the most important 
impact on increases in THCE. This finding undermines the assumption of a reduced care need, 
where pharmaceuticals would substitute for other health services, thus lowering the use of 
health care and bringing down health expenditures. It also corroborates the observation that the 
responsibility for the costs of prescription medicines has been passed around between the parties 
(the municipalities, the NHI and the patients), ending up most often in the hands of the NHI 
(Huttunen, 2008). However, since no large regional differences in the use of prescribed medicines 
in the country have appeared and both the measures of income elasticity in this study were very 
small, the result suggests that the use of health services from which local health expenditures were 
derived is not a sufficiently good measure. Therefore, the use of prescription medicines probably 
reflects population morbidity, especially the regional or municipal differences in morbidity, as 
sick people need prescription medicines in addition to health services. 
We have assumed that the year dummy variables capture the unknown time effects such as 
technological development and general economic growth. Nevertheless, one might still argue 
that an increase in THCE has partly been a result of an increase in medicine expenditure due to 
the development, promotion and use of newer and advanced medical care products, as reflected 
by the large positive coefficient of the reimbursed medicines (remedi). However, there is also 
evidence that at the aggregate level, technological improvement in pharmaceutical products does 
not increase the health expenditure but indeed decreases it (Abdülkadir and Köksal, 2009). This 
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gives support to our argument that at the municipality level, the rising trend in health spending 
connected to the use of prescription medicines is attributable to higher population morbidity 
and the increased number of patients to be treated. On the other hand, the growth in health 
expenditures on older people is also thought to be attributable to the connection between wealth 
and longevity. Future senior citizens are expected to have higher income and better general health 
than their present-day counterparts. If owing to the effect of higher income, the share of the 
elderly population with good health steadily increases and therefore the likelihood that they need 
to move to institutional care diminishes, then aging and the costs of institutional care generated 
by it may have a lesser impact on THCE in the future. 
The estimated negative association of the municipal tax rate and THCE points toward the 
fact that the tax burden is relatively lower in the big and populated municipalities than in the 
small and remote ones. Hence, the former can provide their inhabitants with more services 
from a relatively lower tax burden than average. As the municipal tax rate can be manipulated 
to correct the imbalance between municipal revenues and expenses, the tax rate variable might 
be endogenous. Unfortunately, since the function of the local tax rate is not known and good 
instruments for the tax rate variable are not available with the present data, we have not been able 
to model THCE within, for example, a two-stage least-squares regression. However, by using the 
interaction between the local tax rate and income, we have shown that the local tax rate could 
be made use of as a method of financing to improve the municipalities’ budget and revenue base 
and thus to deal with increased health expenditure. Moreover, our application of a two-stage 
estimation procedure has retrieved the estimates of the time-invariant hospital districts that the 
traditional FE model removed from its estimation. Nevertheless, we have not been able to explain 
the variation in THCE that is likely to be accounted for by numerous lasting upper-level structural 
factors and/or organizational solutions and choices (e.g. which hospital district a municipality 
belongs to and what methods and cost structures each hospital district has applied in practice) 
and thus is outside the scope of our study. 
To conclude, the differences in municipal total health expenditure are mainly explained by 
the shares of the elderly, the employment-to-population ratio, the rate of disability pensions, the 
municipal tax rate, the NHI reimbursements of prescription medicines and private dental care, 
income, and population density. Both measures of income elasticity were very small, implying 
that public health care is a major necessity good. Higher use of prescription medicines has likely 
resulted from increased morbidity, and local tax rates seemed to be have been used as a device to 
finance local services due to disparate municipal financial capacities. The findings confirm to the 
importance of investing in health policy actions and measures that promote health and prevent 
diseases as well as maintain work and daily activities. To achieve long-term efficiency effects with 
health care decentralization, more attention should be paid to the state grant system or financial 
incentives and possibilities for reinforcing the municipalities’ revenue base and financial capacity 
to secure the funding and provision of public health care. 
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Appendix A. The total health care expenditure measure used 
in the study
Health care (I) Elderly care (II)
Municipal services
•  Primary health care
•  Specialized hospital
    care
Private services
•  Medicines prescribed
    by doctors
•  Doctors' services
•  Examinations and 
    treatments
•  Dental services
Municipal services
•  Home help (e.g. 
    home and support 
    services, day care
    centers, care
    allowances)
•  Sheltered housing
•  Residential homes
Private services
•  Housing
•  Care allowances
These are included in 
the National Health 
Insurance scheme
These are supported 
by the National Health 
Insurance
Total health care = Health care and elderly care = (I) + (II)
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Appendix B. The estimates of the individual municipality 
effects from both the two-way fixed effects models based on 
a two-stage estimation procedure 
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FIGURE B1. The individual effects of the municipality dummies obtained from Model 1.
FIGURE B2. The individual effects of the municipality dummies obtained from Model 2.
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